This paper provides a semantics for input/input output logic based on formal concept analysis. The central result shows that an input/output logic axiomatised by a relation R is the same as the logic induced by deriving pairs from the concept lattice generated by R using a ∧-and ∨-classical Scott consequence relation. This correspondence offers powerful analytical techniques for classifying, visualising and analysing input/output relations, revealing implicit hierarchical structure and/or natural clusterings and dependencies. The application of all formal developments are illustrated by a worked example towards the end.
Introduction
Input/output logic is a branch of conditional logic, broadly conceived, whose distinguishing feature is that it does not make any assumptions about the ultimate nature of the relation that holds between a set of conditions and its consequences. That may not sound like much, but it makes a real difference, both formally and philosophically.
Philosophically, it goes against a habit of logicians of assimilating all kinds of connections between a condition and a consequence to the inference paradigm: causality becomes causal inference, by which is meant the drawing of conclusions about a causal connection based on the conditions for the occurrence of an effect. The study of sets of norms becomes the study of normative reasoning, by which is usually meant the application of a practical syllogism or the drawing of a conclusion about the optimality of some state of affairs.
Although this method of investigation is sometimes natural, it is certainly not inevitable, nor is it always the most direct strategy available. After all, studying causality by way of our reasoning about it is a somewhat roundabout way of approaching the object. The causal relation itself is not an inference relation, strictly speaking, it is a relation between things or natural phenomena. At best, co-variation of causes and effects correspond to conditionals only in a derivative sense therefore. Analogical remarks apply to sets of norms: a norm is not primarily a conditional, it is a stipulation that holds by decree.
Input/output logic gives expression to this latter way of looking at things. A correlation between a condition and a consequence is seen as just an element in an ordinary binary relation between states of affairs as described by formulae. The ultimate nature and origin of this relation is left open, which just means that input/output logic does not foreclose any interpretational options.
On a formal level, the thrust of this general stance-which is justified in more detail in [11] -is to shift the emphasis from a theory formulated in terms of the behaviour of object-language connectives to a theory formulated in terms of the behaviour of sets and relations. Its methodological significance consists in the fact that it allots to philosophical logic a parcel in a wider mathematical landscape where logic is naturally tangent upon e.g. lattice theory and universal algebra.
The present discussion proceeds subject to this general conception to study the particular tangiental point which exists between input/output logic and the branch of lattice theory called formal concept analysis (FCA for short). The basic idea is this: formal concept lattices offer powerful, wellstudied, analytical techniques for classifying, visualising and analysing binary relations, revealing implicit hierarchical structure and/or natural clusterings and dependencies between the objects of the relation [5] . Since the set of axioms in any given input/output logic is just a binary relation between formulae, it ought to be possible to apply results from FCA to the study of forms of conditionality that are not naturally assimilated to the model based on inference relations and/or conditionals-e.g. to sets of norms (an example that will be used for illustration purposes throughout the paper). This idea was first proposed in [20] , but without being developed in much detail.
The principal research question of the present paper is the following: given a binary relation G over sets of formulae, what is the relation between the concept lattice induced by G on the one hand and the input/output logic axiomatised by G on the other? The paper does not answer this question generally, but limits itself to a couple of more specific results summarised below:
First, there is a faithful embedding into FCA of the system of input/output logic called basic output in the nomenclature of Makinson and van der Torre. More precisely, we have that A) the concept lattice induced by the relation G is equivalent (in a sense to be made precise) to G itself modulo basic output, and B) there is a rule for evaluating any pair of formulae (a, b) against the concept lattice induced by G that answers yes iff (a, b) is in system of basic output axiomatised by G. Stated differently, for any given system of basic output, the concept lattice induced by the axioms of that system can A) itself be turned into a set of axioms for the system, and B) constitutes a semantic structure for it.
The second result concerns the system of input/output logic that Makinson and van der Torre call basic reusable output, which is the system that results from adding a rule of cumulative transitivity to the set of rules for basic output. The theme is now varied a bit: whereas it would be convenient to try and extend the results for basic output in the straightforward manner and ask whether the concept lattice induced by G can be turned into a set of axioms for the system of basic reusable output having G as a set of axioms, this would not be a very interesting exercise given the goals of the present paper. The central concern of the present paper is to bring input/output logic into the ambit of formal concept analysis, more specifically to make it possible to draw on lattice theoretic techniques in the analysis of a given input/output system. Obviously, this requires information to be encoded in the concept lattice. Yet, if one were to extend the results for basic output in the straightforward manner, then the set of generators/axioms of the logic would remain the same and so would the corresponding concept lattice. In other words, the concept lattice would not reflect the change of logic.
Instead therefore, the strategy that chosen is to encode pairs whose derivation is licensed by the rule of cumulative transitivity into the concept lattice itself by extending the relation G to a larger relation G + that still induces a finite lattice. This process is referred to as saturating the axioms-or simply as saturation. It is proved that saturation yields an axiomatisation for a system of basic reusable output analogous to A) above, although the procedure is not exhaustive enough to supply a non-trivial semantics in the sense of B).
This notwithstanding, it is argued that saturation is instructive and helpful in precisely the way it was hoped that it would be, namely as offering a lattice theoretic basis for exploration of a transitive input/output logic. This claim is substantiated by working through an example towards the end of the paper, where it is suggested that the modular structure of a corpus of norms may fruitfully be analysed along lattice theoretic lines.
Preliminaries
Notation. Let L be a language containing a countable set of elementary letters. The zero-ary falsum ⊥ is counted among the connectives of L, and is defined as ¬ ⊥. Lower case letters a, b, c... range over formulae of L, upper case letters A, B, C, . . . range over sets of formulae, and W -Z over arbitrary sets. As usual ∧ and ∨ denote classical conjunction and disjunction, respectively, but will do dual service as infima and suprema in a lattice. That is, when A is a finite set of formulae then A is taken to denote the conjunction and A the disjunction of its finitely many elements, whilst if X is an unspecified set then X is meet and X is join. The upper case letter G ranges over L × L, that is, G denotes a binary relation over sentences in L. For arbitrary relations of any arity the letter R will be used. For any relation R, R i denotes the projection of R onto its i-th coordinate, whereas r, s, . . . range over elements of R. We adopt the convention of writing r i instead of {r} i .
Generalized consequence relations
The developments that follow assume a background sentential logic, typically classical logic, which it will be convenient to present in terms of a generalized consequence relation ⊆ 2 L × 2 L on a language L satisfying the following three conditions:
Reflexivity: a a Thinning:
If A B then A , A B, B Cut:
If A, a B and A a, B then A B
Special care is required when dealing with the empty set, which is equivalent to the falsum on the right of the turnstile and to the verum on the left of it. That is,
It is common to interpret the comma on the left of the turnstile as conjunction and the comma on the right as disjunction, giving the following informal reading of A, B C, D: if the conjunction of sentences in the union of A and B is true then necessarily the disjunction of sentences in the union of C and D is true as well. It is in general dangerous to understand this in terms of classical conjunction and disjunction, since the meaning and behaviour of the comma depends on the relation . However, it is a reading that is encouraged for the purposes of the present paper, since consequence relations will henceforth be assumed to be ∧-classical and ∨-classical (cf. [7, chp. 1.1.]):
Input/output logic
The theory of input/output logic was first developed in Makinson and van der Torre [13, 14, 15] , where four systems are singled out for special attention: simple-minded output, basic output (making intelligent use of disjunctive inputs), simple-minded reusable output (in which outputs may be recycled as inputs), and basic reusable output [13] . These are defined semantically and characterised by different constellations of derivation rules taken from the following set:
Different choices of rules give different relations of derivability ⊆ 2 L×L × L, where the concept of derivability is defined as follows:
A rule R of arity n ≥ 0 is an n + 1-ary relation over the set L × L of pairs of formulae in the language L. For any sequence of pairs ((a 1 , b 1 ), . . . , (a n , b n ), (a n+1 , b n+1 )) ∈ R the premises of the rule is the subsequence (a 1 , b 1 ), . . . , (a n , b n ) and (a n+1 , b n+1 ) is its conclusion. A derivation of a pair (a, b) from a set of input/output axioms G ⊆ L × L by means of a set of rules X is understood to be a tree with (a, b) at the root, each non-leaf node related to its immediate parents by the inverse of a rule in X, and each leaf node an element of G or identical to ( , ).
Note that definition 2.2 hard-wires the axiom ( , ) into the very concept of derivability from G irrespective of whether or not G contains it. Anomalous, but harmless, this axiom reflects the original input/output semantics where ( , ) follows semantically from any G modulo any input/output operator. The concept semantics developed in the section 3 does not have this feature, and the pair ( , ) will eventually drop out of view. Table 1 summarizes the nomenclature of [13] . Here, n denotes derivability according to definition 2.2 for different choices of rule set identified by the subscript n: Each n is a Tarski consequence relation, that is, it satisfies the following conditions of r eflexivity, monotony and cumulative transitivity:
R:
g n g any g ∈ G M:
If G n g then G, G n g CT: If G n g for each g ∈ G and G, G n g then G n g Each relation n may also be seen as an operation taking a relation G to a larger relation C n (G) = df {(a, b) : G n (a, b)}. As so defined C n is a closure operator satisfying inclusion, monotony and id empotence:
The two representations will be used interchangeably.
Note that in the present paper there are now two kinds of consequence relation in play: the relation n between 2 L×L and L, and the relation between 2 L and 2 L . The former is a Tarski consequence relation whereas the latter is a generalized consequence relation, aka. Scott consequence relation. The two should not be conflated.
Formal concept analysis
Formal concept analysis is a mathematical theory of data analysis based on lattice theory. It offers a principled way of deriving an implicit classificatory hierarchy from a dataset, grouping objects by the properties they satisfy. The taxons of such a hierarchy are called formal concepts which are considered to be determined by their extent and intent: the extent consists of all objects belonging to the concept, while the intent is the collection of all attributes shared by the objects [4, p. 65 ]. The relation between a set of objects and a set of attributes is called a context:
where W and X are sets and R ⊆ W × X. The elements of W and X are called objects and attributes respectively.
Obviously, any binary relation R can be considered a context with W = R 1 and X = R 2 . Now, for Y ⊆ W and Z ⊆ X, define Definition 2.4.
so Y is the set of attributes common to all the objects in Y and Z is the set of objects possessing all the attributes in Z [4, p. 67]. The pair ( , ) forms a Galois connection between 2 Y and 2 Z in which is the lower-and the upper adjoint:
A concept is a pair (Y, Z) of objects and attributes that is evenly balanced in the sense that Z contains just those properties that pertain to all objects in Y , whereas Y is precisely the set of objects that have all the properties in Z:
The notational convention is to denote the set of all the concepts of a context (W, X, R) as B(W, X, R). In the case where W = R 1 and X = R 2 this notation will henceforth be simplified to B(R). The following lemmata are all standard and proofs are therefore omitted:
Conversely, all such pairs are concepts.
The next lemma is also useful, and since the present author is not aware of it being explicitly recorded anywhere, a verification is included.
Concepts can be ordered by extents or intents by putting
The two alternatives give the same ordering since upper and lower adjoints of Galois connections are antitone (by theorem 2.5). The fundamental theorem of formal concept analysis says that the set of concept B(W, X, R) of a context (W, X, R) forms a complete lattice under ≤ in which meet and join are given by,
Moreover, the relation R is encoded in, and can be read off from, the lattice B(W, X, R). Put
Conversely, the extent and intent of any concept c ∈ B(W, X, R) can be read off using these same functions:
Example 2.11. Fig. 1 shows a cross-table for a binary relation R and the concept lattice it gives rise to. Every concept of form ({y} , {y} ) for some object w ∈ R 1 has been labelled γ(w), and every concept of form ({z} , {z} ) for some attribute z ∈ R 2 has been labelled µ(z). The fundamental theorem of concept lattices says, essentially, that the extent and intent of any concept c in the lattice can be read off from the labels in (↓ c, ↑ c) by letting every argument to µ be an intent and every argument to γ be an extent of the concept in question. For instance the concept labelled γ(
Note that it is not a requirement of concept lattices, although often assumed, that extents and intents be disjoint. This particular liberty is essential for the FCA approach to basic reusable output in section 4.
Concept lattices and basic output.
The connection between concept lattices and input/output logic is based on giving concepts a logical interpretation: recall that (Y, Z) being a concept means that Y consists of the set of objects which is such that each object in Y can be ascribed all attributes in Z. When a concept (A, B) in question is determined by a binary relation G over formulae, it is natural to interpret this as saying that each formula in A constitutes a sufficient condition for every formula in B to obtain. By extension of this thought it is natural to understand extents disjunctively and intents conjunctively.
Henceforth, this interpretation of concepts (restricted, of course, to concept lattices that are generated by relations over formulae) will be made explicit using a function ψ:
Clearly, ψ as so defined is injective. For any set X of concepts X ψ = df {c ψ : ψ ∈ X}.
As mentioned already, the pair ( , ) will not be valid in the concept semantics for basic output that is to be developed in the present section. It therefore needs to be removed from the concept of derivability as well. From here on, derivability means:
A derivation of a pair (a, b) from G, given a set X of rules, is understood to be a tree with (a, b) at the root, each non-leaf node related to its immediate parents by the inverse of a rule in X, and each leaf node an element of G.
Bearing this adjustment in mind, the nomenclature from table 1 will be reused as is. For instance 2 will continue to denote the input/output logic characterised by the set of rules {SI, AN D, W O, OR}, only it is understood that derivability is according to definition 3.2.
Turning now to the first substantial theorem of the present paper, it says that the concept lattice induced by a relation G over formulae gives rise to a set of axioms that are equivalent to G modulo basic output:
Proof. For the left-to-right direction, it suffices to show that 
For the limiting case that C = ∅ we have C =⊥. Since G is non-empty by assumption it follows by lemma 2.9 that D = ∅. Thus there are pairs
For the limiting case that D = ∅ we have D = . Since G is non-empty by assumption it follows by lemma 2.9 that C = ∅. Thus there are pairs (e k , d) ∈ G for k ∈ K such that k∈K e k C.
Note that the correspondence breaks down in the limiting case that G is empty, for then (∅, ∅) ∈ B(G), by lemma 2.9, whence (⊥, ) ∈ B(G) ψ by definition 3.1. Yet, ∅ 2 (⊥, ). The qualification to non-empty G is therefore essential, and recurs throughout.
Whereas theorem 3.3 gives 2 -equivalent lattice representation for a set of input/output axioms G, it is not yet a semantics since what the lattice implies is specified with reference to 2 . The question is whether it is possible to push the envelope and use the concept lattice itself as a semantic structure against which to evaluate pairs of propositions. As it turns out, this question has an affirmative answer.
We have:
Define an operation O 2 as follows:
Proof. For the right-to-left direction, we prove by induction on the derivation of (a, b) from G, using only the stipulated proof rules, that (a, b) ∈ O 2 (G). In the base case (a, b) ∈ G. Since a ∈ a it follows that (a , a ) = (A k , B k ) for some k ∈ I. Therefore since b ∈ a we have {B i } i∈I b as desired. For input strengthening suppose (a, b) is derived from (a , b) by SI. Then by the induction hypothesis there is a family of concepts {(A i , B i )} i∈I with a A i for all i ∈ I and {B i } i∈I b. It thus suffices to show that a A i for all i ∈ I, which follows from a a by cut. For output weakening suppose (a, b) is derived from (a, b ) by W O. Then by the induction hypothesis there is a family of concepts For the converse direction, suppose (a, b) ∈ O 2 (G). Then a A i for each i ∈ I and {B i } i∈I b. It suffices to show for any j ∈ I that (a, B j ) is derivable from G using only the stipulated proof rules, because then (a, i∈I ( B i )) is derivable by AN D, from which it follows in turn that (a, b) is derivable by ∧-classicality and W O. Thus, consider any (A j , B j ) such that j ∈ I. There are four cases to consider:
Then since a A j we have a ∅ and so a ⊥. Since B j = ∅ there are pairs (e 1 , b 1 ), . . . , (e n , b n ) ∈ G such that {b i } 1≤i≤n = B j . We thus have the following derivation
We wish to show that (a, B j ) is derivable from G.
Since B j = ∅ we have B j = , so it suffices to show the derivability of (a, ). Since A j = ∅ there are pairs (a 1 , e 1 ), . . . , (a n , e n ) ∈ G such that {a i } 1≤i≤n = A j . We therefore have the following derivation:
(a 1 , e 1 ), . . . , (a n , e n ) W O (a 1 , ), . . . , (a n , )
Thus, taking the (a i , B j ) as leaves we have the following derivation from G:
This case is ruled out by lemma 2.9 and the assumption that G is non-empty.
Theorem 3.5 can be taken to show that not only can a set of axioms for basic input/output logic be visualised as a concept lattice, the converse is true as well: basic output has a reasonable claim to be called the logic of concept lattices.
Example 3.6. A national labour and welfare service provides social benefits that contribute to the financial security of citizens and other right holders. Being entitled to a social benefit usually depends on certain required pieces of information that are associated by law with the tasks in question. Assume the following lists of tasks and information requirements: 
Concept lattices and basic reusable output.
The previous section showed that any set of axioms for a system of basic output can A) faithfully be represented as a concept lattice (theorem 3.3), and B) that this concept lattice constitutes a semantic structure against which any pair of formulae can be evaluated wrt. membership in the logic in question (theorem 3.5). Taken together, these results offer a way of 'mining' a system of basic output using a blend of lattice theoretic techniques and propositional logic.
It is an interesting question whether a similar result can be established for the stronger, and for certain applications more interesting (cf. section 5) system of basic reusable output. The two parts of this question will continue to be referenced as A) and B) in the following, bearing in mind that it is now derivability according to 4 which is at issue. Care needs to be taken when interpreting A), since it has in one sense already been answered affirmatively: theorem 3.3 showed that G 2 (a, b) iff B(G) ψ 2 (a, b). Since cumulative transitivity is a Horn rule, it follows that
. Thus, representation of any 4 -system by some lattice is immediate. It should be obvious, though, that no ground is gained by this observation if the aim is to analyse the reuse feature of reusable basic output using lattice theoretic techniques, for the lattice representation B(G) ψ is the same as for basic output, whereas the logic of 4 is stronger. In other words, none of the information that is specific to 4 is explicitly present in B(G) ψ .
Better, then, to look for a lattice that, so to speak, wears its 4 -inferences (at least some of them) on its sleeves. This is the strategy that will be pursued in the present section. What is sought is thus a principled way to extend G into a larger G + such that G 4 (a, b) iff B(G + ) ψ 4 (a, b). To be sure, for any such G + it follows that B(G + ) ψ 4 (a, b) iff B(G) ψ 4 (a, b) so B(G + ) will have the same inferential potential as B(G) itself modulo 4 . However, B(G + ) and B(G) is not the same lattice, and this is what matters for present purposes.
In what follows, G + will be built from G by a process called saturationnot to be confused with any of the other things called saturation out therewhich can be thought of as the counterpart to the notion of transitive closure within the FCA framework. If
The following equivalent inductive definition tends to be more convenient in proofs: A 2 . We need to show that A 1 ×B 2 ⊆ G + . From the first assumption we have (
We can thus infer the following about G k :
In light of the fact that A 1 ⊆ A 1 (2.5), item → 2 entails A 1 ×B 2 ⊆ A 1 ×A 2 . Now, B 1 A 2 by assumption. Therefore item → 3 taken together with A 2 ⊆ A 2 (theorem 2.5) entails A 1 A 2 by thinning. But then A 1 ×A 2 ⊆ G k+1 , by → 1 together with case 2 of definition 4.2, whence A 1 × B 2 ⊆ G + by the transitivity of ⊆ as desired.
For the converse direction it suffices to prove by induction on n < ω that G n ⊆ G + . This is immediate for the base case where n = 0. For the induction step, assume as the induction hypothesis that G n−1 ⊆ G + . We need to show that G n ⊆ G + . Suppose not. Then by case 2 of definition 4.2 there are
By the induction hypothesis together with lemma 2.8 we have
We can thus infer the following about G + : ← 1 : (A 1 , A 1 ), (A 2 , A 2 ) ∈ B(G + ) by lemma 2.7, since A 1 , A 2 ⊆ (G + ) 1 by i) and ii).
In light of the fact that A 1 ⊆ A 1 , by theorem 2.5, item ← 2 above entails
A 2 by assumption. Therefore item ← 3 taken together with A 2 ⊆ A 2 (theorem 2.5) entails A 1 A 2 by thinning. But then (A 1 , A 2 ) ∈ G + by → 3 and the rule S. Therefore (A 1 × A 2 ) ⊆ G + whence A 1 × B 2 ⊆ G + by the transitivity of ⊆. This contradicts the assumption that A 1 × B 2 G + .
Note that G + as so defined exists for any G: Proof . Suppose (A 1 , B 1 
Let G be any member of G. Then G ⊆ G from which it follows by lemma 2.10 that there are ( The existence of least fixpoints for the saturation operation provides an answer to A) that is informative wrt. 4 :
The left-to-right inclusion is exactly like that for theorem 3.3 and thus requires the non-emptiness of G.
For the converse inclusion, it suffices by monotony, cumulative transitivity for 4 together with lemma 4.3 to show that (a, b) ∈ B(G + ) ψ implies G 4 (a, b). So, put G + := {G i } i<ω . Since G is finite it follows from definition 4.2 that G + = G n for some finite n. We prove by induction n that the desired implication follows from G + = G n on any value of n.
The proof of the base case reduces to the right-to-left inclusion of theorem 3.3. For the induction step suppose the implication holds for n − 1. Let (a, b) := ( A, B) and suppose (a, b) ∈ B(G n ) ψ . We need to show that G 4 (a, b). Since ψ is injective, we have (A, B) ∈ B(G n ) . If (A, B) ∈ B(G n−1 ) then ( A, B) ∈ B(G n−1 ) ψ and therefore G 4 (a, b) by the induction hypothesis. Suppose therefore that the opposite is the case, i.e. that (A, B) / ∈ B(G n−1 ). There are now two cases to consider: 
A × B
G n−1 : It suffices to show that for every c ∈ A and every d ∈ B we have G 4 (c, d) since then G 4 (c, B) , follows by AN D and G 4 ( A, B) by OR, whence G 4 (a, b) as desired. So let c be any element in A and d any element in B. By the supposition of the case we have A × B G n −1 whilst (A, B) Therefore G 4 (c, d) by the induction hypothesis together with W O and SI. If (c, d) / ∈ G n−1 then since (c, d) ∈ A × B ⊆ G n , by lemma 2.10, it follows by the definition of G n that there are (C,
by the definition of ψ, it follows by the induction hypothesis that ( C, E 1 ), ( E 2 , D) are 4 -derivable from G . We therefore have the following derivation:
This completes the proof.
Turning now to B) the question is whether this concept lattice, where for any given G the anaphor 'this' is bound by the grammatical antecedent B(G + ) gives a semantics (in the broad sense of the term) for the logic C 4 (G). That is, the question is whether there is an evaluation rule similar to O 2 of previous section that given any pair (a, b) acts as the characteristic function for C 4 (G).
The first thing to note in this connection is that the O 2 applied to G + is itself sound wrt. 4 -derivability from G. The proof of this property requires a lemma: Proof. By idempotence and monotony it suffices to show that G + ⊆ C 4 (G). Put G + := {G i } i<ω , which by theorem 4.3 is legitimate. The proof proceeds by induction on n. The base case where n = 0 is immediate. For the induction step, suppose the property holds for n − 1 and suppose (a, b) ∈ G n . If (a, b) ∈ G then there is nothing to prove, so suppose the opposite. Then by case 2 of definition 4.2 there are (
. By repeated applications of AN D and OR it follows
As for the property itself: a, b) , since CT is a Horn condition, and by lemma 4.7 we have that G + 4 (a, b) implies G 4 (a, b). Chaining implications now yields the desired result. Theorem 4.8 says that the lattice B(G + ) may safely be 'mined' for entailments by selecting sets of concepts E G + as specified in definition 3.5-no unlicensed inferences can come from this.
It would have been nice if one could show the converse too, because one would then have a reduction of 4 to 2 in finite concept lattices. However, the converse of theorem 4.8-the completeness direction-does not hold. To see this, put G : = {(a, b 1 Notice that G is already saturated-no intent entails another extent (recall that ∅ on the right of means ⊥). Notice also that , d ) as the following derivation shows:
Since G is in fact saturated, it follows that O 2 is not a 4 -complete evaluation rule wrt. saturated relations in general. In other words G 4 (a, b) does not entail (a, b) ∈ O 2 (G + ), and so does not a fortiori entail B(G + ) ψ 2 (a, b). The saturation procedure is just not sufficiently exhaustive to relieve the input/output processor of the burden of reusing outputs as inputs.
There are two general ways to respond to this situation: one is to come up with a saturation process-'saturation' now being understood in the intuitive sense of a way of amplifying the relation G with pairs that are derivable from G by CT -that is sufficiently complete to make the O 2 rule to work for basic reusable output as well. The second option is of course to define a separate, stronger evaluation rule O 4 .
As regards the first option, one might be tempted to consider C 4 (G) itself a candidate saturated super relation of G. But this would be a sterile move, for even if it were the case that G 4 (a, b) iff B(C 4 (G)) ψ 2 (a, b), which seems likely, this could hardly have been called a semantics since 4 occurs on both sides of the biconditional. Moreover, if the underlying logical language L is not logically finite then B(C 4 (G)) is an infinite concept lattice, so the reduction alluded to above would have lost its luster.
As regards the second option, it is not obvious that O 2 can be strengthened to take up the slack in a way that is non-trivial. That is, although something along the lines of (a, b) ∈ O 4 (G) iff there is a c ∈ L such that (a, c), (a ∧ c, b) ∈ O 2 (G) would work, this too seems a rather unexciting prospect hardly deserving of being called a semantics. Yet, something very much like it is probably required.
The attempt to negotiate an answer to B) in the context of basic reusable output has reached an impasse that at this point is better left for future research. Taking stock, the situation now is this: Every binary relation G over L has a 4 -equivalent representation as a lattice of concepts (theorem 4.6). Moreover, the information contained in B(G) can be processed with the operator O 2 without risk of logical distortion (theorem 4.8). Although, this procedure will not in general produce all the information that is encoded in B(G + ) relative to 4 , the next section argues that it is enough to secure interesting applications.
Extended example
A legal corpus is an eminent example of a relation between conditions and consequences that it is not natural to subsume under the inference paradigm, and/or to treat as a set of conditionals. As Hans Kelsen argued, norms are better seen as stipulations, laid down by some authority for some purpose, that are logically arbitrary: "Norms posited by human acts of will are arbitrary in the genuine signification of the word: that is, they can decree any behaviour whatsoever to be obligatory" [8, p. 4] .
The purpose of the present section is to illustrate the concept representation of input/output logic developed in the preceding sections by analysing a hypothetical but not unrealistic example of statutory law. The analysis is centered on the role of the principle of transitivity as a rule that serves to link separately maintained areas of law into a cohesive whole. The transitivity of normative implicature, one might say, is a principle that allows law to be modular.
By an area of law-fuzziness admitted-will here be meant some set of legal norms (written or otherwise) that approaches a distinct social institution. That is, it is practised by specialists, it has a more or less clearly demarcated legal subject matter, it evolves in relative independence from other areas of law, and so on and so forth. By way of example, property law defines the conditions under which rights and obligations pertaining to the control of physical and intangible objects are transferred between legal persona, whereas criminal law sets out the punishment to be imposed on behaviour that threatens, harms or endangers the safety and welfare of individuals or the society as a whole. Administrative law governs eligibility to hold office as well as the activities of administrative agencies of government, whereas banking law subject banks to requirements that create transparency between banking institutions and the individuals and corporations with whom they conduct business, etc.
The idea that is proposed in the present section is that it is by recognition of the transitivity of normative implicature that these different areas of law make up a cohesive whole. That is, when the law as such recognizes the general principle of chaining norms it becomes possible for one area of law to reuse legal consequences from another area of law as applicability conditions or legal provisos for its own regulatives.
Penal law occupies a central position in this edifice insofar as the sanctions imposed by penal law is an important determinant for the rights and obligations that can be ascribed to a legal person subject to another area of law. It is thus natural to take penal law as the starting point for the analysis to follow.
Note first that penal law usually distinguishes between different categories of unwanted behaviour. It should be emphasized at this point that, as stated, the offenses and punishments in table 2 are not sentences, but rather predicates and open sentences that can in general be instantiated by different agents. The correlation of such predicates is not in general free of problems since it may involve e.g. considerations of arity (cf. [9] ). 1 Yet, going into detail about this would cloud the overall picture of the role of the principle transitivity in a modular corpus of norms, and it is uncertain whether the gains would be worth the investment. For now, therefore, the reader is simply invited to mentally prepend 'x is guilty of ... ' and ' x is sentenced to ...', or something like it, wherever appropriate.
6m 10y 21y f fl ls rp ii or mi fig. 4 gives an 2 -equivalent representation of the penal code in question: In order to bring the principle of transitivity into the picture, note that it is not usually the case that the sanctions as defined in a penal statute figure as applicability conditions/legal grounds in other statutes literally, for whereas the punishments of penal law are usually specific-at least within a reasonable range-about the form, duration and severity of a sanction, legal grounds are typically more general, and, in the case of sanctions, grouped into transgressions that are deemed to be relevantly similar.
To make this more concrete, consider the device of legal debarment, i.e. the act of depriving a person of certain legal rights as a consequence of his or her legal history. Common examples include exclusion from public office, suspension, exclusion from various kinds of occupation and/or ineligibility for rendering a public service such as e.g. jury duty. By way of example, consider tables 4 and 5:
rlt sw hp jd ≥6m × × ic × × × or × Each row in the upper half of table 5 represents a general form of punishment that in this context is to be considered a legal proviso-i.e. it serves to ensure that transgressions falling under it, as specified by penal law, is to have as a legal consequence that there is a capacity in the lower half of table 5 that the offender shall not be allowed to operate in. Suppose provisos and preclusions are correlated as in table 4. Each correlation may be thought of as a point of contact between the penal code from table 3 and some other area of law, for instance a health care professionals act or real estate law.
As to the question of how to render this formally, theorem 4.6 shows that if one adopts basic reusable output as one's logic of norms, then the cumulative effect of tables 3 and 4 can be visualized by taking the union of the two tables, call it G and saturating the resulting relation, call it G + , before generating the corresponding concept lattice B(G + ).
is therefore very well suited for querying the cumulative effects of the legal modules in question.
Consider for instance the question "what are the legal consequences of spying on the military, or on the diplomacy, or on the secret services for a hostile and foreign power". If one takes it that each of these disjuncts imply high treason, then the disjunction as such, call it a, implies high treason. Now, theorem 4.8 says that E G + (a) collects legal consequences of a that are all valid according to basic reusable output, and under the assumption that a ht one has E G + (a) = {({ht}, {21y, ls, jd, rlt})}. Thus the legal consequences of spying on the military, or the diplomacy, or the secret services for a hostile and foreign power is Cn({21y, ls, jd, rlt}) where Cn is the operation of classical consequence. Thus a person found guilty of espionage will in addition to being liable to imprisonment of up to 21 years, face a number of other sanctions that arise from the interaction of the penal statute with other areas of law. For instance, he or she will not be eligible for jury duty, does not necessarily retain his or her right to vote, and cannot become a realtor-a bit of a surprise at the end there. Figure 5 : The lattice corresponding to the saturated context 6. Related work 6.1. The theory of joining systems In a series of papers going back at least as far as 1999 (thus predating input/output logic) Lars Lindahl and Jan Odelstad have developed an algebraic theory of relations between pre-ordered sets-or, as they prefer to call them, quasi-orderings-called the theory of joining systems. The most recent, and most complete presentation of this theory is [9] , which also contains references to earlier stages of research.
The theory of joining systems bears some striking resemblances to input/output logic. Philosophically, both idioms were originally motivated by the study of normative systems, and both idioms view norms, not as conditionals capable of being true and false, but rather as logically arbitrary stipulations correlating applicability conditions with states of affairs deemed optimal relative to some end or purpose. Both theories acknowledge the influence of the tradition from Alchourrón and Bulygin in this respect [1, 2] .
The theory of joining system itself is not tied to this interpretation, however, but is entirely abstract: the carrier sets of the quasi-orders in question need not be construed concretely as sets of formulae. For present purposes it will be convenient to do so, though. Indeed, for comparison with input/output logic, the case of interest is that where the quasi-orders are boolean algebras generated by the elementary letters of some propositional language.
So interpreted, a joining system is a tuple B 1 , B 2 , J where each B i is a boolean algebra, that is, B i = A i , ≤ where A i is a set of formulae and ≤ is the induced partial order. The set of joinings J is a relation from A 1 × A 2 which is constrained in certain ways in order induce logical behaviour. Define the narrowness relation on A 1 × A 2 by stipulating that (a 1 , b 1 ) (a 2 , b 2 ) iff a 2 ≤ a 1 and b 1 ≤ b 2 . The joining system B 1 , B 2 , J is required to satisfy the following conditions for all a, b, a 1 , a 2 , b 1 , b 2 ∈ A 1 ∪ A 2 :
Whether this conjecture is indeed true, is a question that is here left open. The interested reader is referred to [22] for a detailed comparison of the two idioms.
Suffice it for present purposes to say that what matters matters for the informativeness of a concept lattice is ultimately the syntactic form or shape of the set of axioms for an input/output system. So even if it were the case that a system C n (G) of of input/output logic could be represented as a set of joinings J , the relationship between J and the concept lattice induced by G would not thereby necessarily have been determined.
Related work in input/output logic
Driven by different considerations and objectives, various modifications of the original input/output logic semantics have been proposed. Bochman [3] sees input/output logic primarily as a formalism for reasoning about production systems and causal inference, and furnishes it with a semantics formulated in terms of deductively closed theories called bimodels. Another approach that belongs to the same general field is Goncalves and Alferes [6] , who recast input/output logic as an extension of answer set programming, thereby extending it with non-monotonic features.
Some modifications to the input/output idiom have also been proposed by normative systems theorists, who as a group tend to stay closer to the original semantic idiom. Most of these approaches are developed from a classical basis, but uses it differently to achieve different effects than the original input/output semantics. Stolpe [19] considers a weakening of input/output logic that retains input strengthening whilst discarding output weakening in the context of a transitive logic. This involves redefining the input/output semantics in an inductive manner not unlike the inductive reformulation of Reiter default logic given in Makinson [12] . Parent and van der Torre [17] extend the work of [19] in two directions: first the logic is made to support reasoning by cases alias OR, and secondly cumulative transitivity is replaced with a a principle the authors call aggregative cumulative transitivity, which differs from the former principle in keeping tabs on the 'history' of the chaining process. Parent and van der Torre [17] is in turn is used in Sun and van der Torre [21] in studying the interplay between regulative and constitutive rules in a normative system.
As regards approaches to input/output logic that do not take classical logic as the underlying propositional language, we are aware of only one. This is Parent et al. [18] which substitutes intuitionistic logic for classical logic and tracks the changes that must be made to the semantic idiom in order to obtain the same syntactic characterisation of the different input/output systems, up to the meaning of the connectives.
As regards the interface between input/output logic and abstract algebra, there does not seem to be many forerunners to the present paper. The correspondence between the system of basic output and formal concept lattices was first noticed in Stolpe [20] , without being developed into a systematic account.
A good introduction to some of the input/output logics currently in existence is [16] .
